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Fregean Particularism 
Susanna Schellenberg (Rutgers) 
It is Monday morning and I am riding the train through the post-industrial wasteland of northern New 
Jersey. I gaze out of the window and, suddenly, I see a deer. Let’s call it Frederik. The next morning, I am 
again on the train, riding through northern New Jersey. And, again, I see a deer. Let’s call it Ferdinand. It 
is the same time of day. Everything looks exactly the same on Tuesday as it did on Monday—including 
the deer. However, unbeknownst to me, the deer I see on Tuesday is not the same as the one I saw on 
Monday. So I am seeing different particulars.  
How does the fact that I am seeing Frederik on Monday and Ferdinand on Tuesday affect my 
perceptual state? One possible answer is to argue that the content of my perceptual state on Monday is 
constituted by Frederik, while the content of my perceptual state on Tuesday is constituted by Ferdinand. 
If this is right, what is the nature of this singular perceptual content? When we suffer a non-veridical 
hallucination as of an object, then it seems to us that there is a particular object present, where in fact 
there is no such object. If veridical perceptual states have singular content, what is the content of a 
hallucination? Since in hallucination, we are not perceptually related to the particulars we seem to see, a 
hallucination cannot have singular content. What content, then, does a hallucination have? Finally, what 
accounts for the phenomenal character of hallucination, whereby it seems to us that a particular is present 
when no such particular is actually before us?  
These questions can be put into focus by articulating two desiderata for any account of perception. 
One desideratum is to explain perceptual particularity, that is, to explain in virtue of what a perceptual 
state is constituted by the perceived particular. Let’s call this the particularity desideratum. The other 
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desideratum is to explain what accounts for the possibility that perceptions of qualitatively identical yet 
numerically distinct particulars could have the same phenomenal character. Let’s call this the phenomenal 
sameness desideratum. More generally, the phenomenal sameness desideratum is to explain what 
accounts for the possibility that perceptions, hallucinations, illusions of distinct environments could have 
the same phenomenal character.1  
In Section 1, I will discuss these two desiderata in turn. In Section 2, I will consider several ways 
one might attempt to satisfy both desiderata and will show why they do not succeed. In Section 3, I will 
develop a particular way of understanding singular content that satisfies both desiderata. I will call this 
view Fregean particularism. In Section 4, I will compare Fregean particularism to competitor views. In 
developing this account of singular content, I will consider many views along the way. I will argue 
against them only to the extent that it helps motivate Fregean particularism and situate it within a broader 
philosophical context.  
1. Two Desiderata for an Account of Perception  
We can understand the claim that two experiential states have the same phenomenal character as follows: 
Phenomenal Sameness:  If two experiential states e1 and e2 of the experiencing subject S have 
the same phenomenal character, then S would be unable to discern any 
difference between e1 and e2, even if her perceptual and introspective 
abilities were ideal.  
An experiential state, as understood here, is the state one is in when one is either perceiving, 
hallucinating, or suffering an illusion. It is important to distinguish the case in which two experiences 
have the same phenomenal character from the case in which they are merely subjectively 
                                                      
1 One might argue that the only case in which two consecutive perceptions genuinely have the same phenomenal character are 
ones in which one consecutively perceives qualitatively identical, yet numerically distinct particulars. If one holds this, one 
would hold that the phenomenal sameness desideratum does not apply to cases in which a hallucination seemingly has the same 
phenomenal character as a perception. I will here assume that a hallucination could have the same phenomenal character as a 
perception and so will take the phenomenal sameness desideratum to apply more generally. However, the argument of this paper 
would need to be adjusted only slightly to apply to the more restrictive view on which a perception and a hallucination could 
never have the same phenomenal character.  
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indistinguishable. We can all agree that we might have two consecutive experiences e3 and e4 that are so 
similar that they are subjectively indistinguishable. We may be unable to tell them apart because we fail 
to properly attend to the details presented to us. Or, we might attend to all the details presented to us, but 
nonetheless be unable to tell the two experiences apart because we lack the requisite perceptual capacities. 
Neither is a case in which e3 and e4 have the same phenomenal character. After all, in the first kind of 
case, we could notice the difference between e3 and e4 if we paid better attention; in the second kind of 
case, we could notice the difference between e3 and e4 if our perceptual capacities were better.  
The classic case of two perceptions that have the same phenomenal character is the case of 
consecutively perceiving qualitatively identical yet numerically distinct objects, ceteris paribus. More 
generally, if in two consecutive perceptions there is no qualitative difference in the environment (despite 
there being a difference in numerical identity of the perceived objects) and if the subject is perceptually 
related to the environment in the very same way, then, ceteris paribus, there is no difference in 
phenomenal character between the two perceptual states. In short, phenomenal character can be exactly 
the same even if the environment varies.  
Moving on to the particularity desideratum: we can all agree that when a subject perceives a 
particular, she is causally related to the particular she perceives. It is uncontroversial and compatible with 
almost any view of perception that there is such a causal relation between a subject and a perceived 
particular—though views differ dramatically with regard to how much explanatory weight the causal 
relation can carry. Consider the case of two experiences, one of which is a perception of an object, the 
other of which is a hallucination with the same phenomenal character. It is uncontroversial and 
compatible with almost any view of perception that there is a difference in causal relation between the 
two experiences. When a subject perceives an object, she is causally related to the mind-independent 
object she is perceiving. When a subject suffers a hallucination with the same phenomenal character, she 
is not causally related to a mind-independent object that it seems to her she is perceiving. Acknowledging 
that there is a difference in causal relation between the two experiences is not sufficient to satisfy the 
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particularity desideratum. To satisfy the particularity desideratum, we need to explain in virtue of what a 
subject’s perceptual state M brought about by being perceptually related to the particular α is constituted 
by α 
  We can all agree moreover that when a subject consciously perceives her environment, she is 
perceptually conscious of a particular. Now, our experience can be as of a particular, even if we are not in 
fact perceptually related to a particular. After all, when we suffer a non-veridical hallucination as of, say, 
a yellow rubber duck, it sensorily seems to us that there is a yellow rubber duck where in fact there is no 
such duck. So our phenomenal character can be as of a particular even if we are not perceptually related 
to that particular. In this sense, perceptual experiences are (as) of particulars. We can call this aspect of 
phenomenal character phenomenological particularity.  
Phenomenological particularity:  A mental state manifests phenomenological particularity if 
and only if it phenomenally seems to the subject that there is 
a particular present.  
So a mental state manifests phenomenological particularity if and only if the particularity is in the scope 
of how things seem to the subject: phenomenological particularity does not require that there be a 
particular that seems to the subject to be present, but just that it seems to the subject that there is a 
particular present.  
Every perceptual experience (as) of a particular manifests phenomenological particularity. Indeed 
it is unclear what it would be to have a perceptual experience that seems to be of a material, mind-
independent particular without its sensorily seeming to the subject that such a particular is present. If a 
subject has an experience that is intentionally directed at a particular and subjectively indistinguishable 
from perceiving a particular, it will seem to her as if she is experiencing a particular—regardless of 
whether she is in fact perceptually related to a particular, or is suffering an illusion or hallucination as of a 
particular. So phenomenological particularity is a feature of any perceptual experience—be it a 
perception, a hallucination, or an illusion.  
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We can distinguish the relatively uncontroversial idea that perceptual experience manifests 
phenomenological particularity from the controversial idea that perception is characterized by relational 
particularity. A mental state is characterized by relational particularity if and only if the mental state is 
constituted by the particular perceived. More precisely: 
Relational particularity:  A subject’s perceptual state M brought about by being perceptually 
related to the particular α is characterized by relational particularity if 
and only if M is constituted by α.  
To satisfy the particularity desideratum, we need to show how it is that a perceptual state is constituted by 
the particular perceived, and thus characterized by relational particularity (rather than mere 
phenomenological particularity).  
  Often relational particularity and phenomenological particularity are implicitly equated. This is 
problematic. One should allow for the possibility that a subject can be intentionally directed at what 
seems to her to be a material, mind-independent particular even if there is no such particular present and 
so acknowledge that a perceptual state could manifest phenomenological particularity without 
manifesting relational particularity. Moreover, one should allow for the possibility that perceptions of 
numerically distinct yet qualitatively identical particulars yield perceptual states that are constituted by 
different particulars, yet manifest the same phenomenological particularity. As I will show, only if we 
recognize the distinction between phenomenological and relational particularity can we account for the 
difference between perceptions of distinct yet qualitatively identical objects.2 
The distinction between phenomenological and relational particularity allows us to reformulate the 
opening questions more specifically. Why think that when we perceive a particular our perceptual state is 
constituted by the particular perceived and thus is characterized by relational particularity in addition to 
                                                      
2 There is moreover a powerful tradition of sidelining relational particularity in favor of phenomenological particularity. For 
example, Crane—focusing on singular thought—puts all the weight on the cognitive or phenomenological role of a thought, that 
is, what I call phenomenological particularity: “what matters is not that the [singular] thought happens to refer to just one thing, 
but that it has a specific cognitive role. Singularity is a matter of the cognitive—that is, the psychological or phenomenological—
role of the thought” (Crane 2011: 25). Crane’s focus is not on what makes it the case that a thought is about this particular rather 
than that one, but rather in virtue of what thoughts have a singular character, that is, what makes them manifest 
phenomenological particularity.  
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phenomenological particularity? How should we account for the fact that when we suffer a hallucination, 
our mental state manifests phenomenological particularity, despite lacking relational particularity? In 
answering these questions, we can show how it is that in the case of an accurate perception, we are 
sensorily aware of particulars, and how it is that even when we are suffering a hallucination, our 
experience can be as of environmental particulars despite the fact that we are not perceptually related to at 
least one of the particulars to which it seems to us we are related. 
1.1. Relationalism and Representationalism  
There are two radically different conceptions of perception. According to relationalism, a perceptual state 
is constitutively a matter of standing in an awareness or an acquaintance relation to the environment. 
According to representationalism, a perceptual state is constitutively a matter of representing the 
environment. So while representationalists analyze perceptual states in terms of their representational 
content, relationalists analyze perceptual states in terms of awareness or acquaintance relations to mind-
independent particulars.  
Relationalism and representationalism are widely considered to be in conflict.3 But the debate 
between relationalists and representationalists sets up a false dichotomy. The source of this false 
dichotomy is that the standard views in the debate are either austerely relationalist or austerely 
representationalist. To a first approximation, austere relationalism has it that perception is constitutively 
relational and lacks any representational component. To a first approximation, austere 
representationalism has it that perception is constitutively representational and lacks any relational 
component that has repercussions for the experiential state.4 Against both, I will argue that perceptual 
                                                      
3 For a recent articulation of this view, see Campbell 2002. Though see Schellenberg 2010 for a representationalist view that does 
not fit this dichotomy; see Beck (forthcoming) for a relationalist view that does not fit this dichotomy.  
4 For austere representationalist views, see McGinn 1982, Davies 1992, Tye 1995, Lycan 1996, Byrne 2001, and Hill 2009 
among many others. For austere relationalist views, see Campbell 2002, Travis 2004, Johnston 2004, 2014, Brewer 2006, Fish 
2009, Logue 2014, Genone 2014, Gomes and French 2016, and Raleigh 2014, 2015 among others. Martin (2002, 2004) leaves 
open the possibility that experience could have content, but his positive view of perception is structurally similar to that of 
austere relationalists. Campbell (2002) calls his view the “relational view,” Martin (2002, 2004) calls his “naïve realism,” while 
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relations to the environment and the content of experience are mutually dependent. I will argue that by 
employing perceptual capacities we are related to our environment—at least in the case of perception. 
Perceptual capacities function to discriminate and single out particulars.5 Thus, perception is 
constitutively relational. I argue moreover that the perceptual capacities employed constitute the 
representational content of our perceptual state. Thus, perception is constitutively representational. In this 
way, I will show that there is no tension between perception being constitutively both relational and 
representational. But first let’s take a closer look at what it means for perception to be relational and what 
it means for perception to be representational.  
Perceiving subjects have been argued to be perceptually related to many different kinds of entities. 
These entities fall into two groups: abstract or mind-dependent entities, such as qualia, sense-data, 
propositions, or intentional objects, on the one hand; and, on the other hand, concrete, mind-independent 
objects, property-instances, or events, such as a white coffee cup resting on a desk. In the current 
discussion, the thesis that perception is relational means always that perception is constitutively a matter 
of a subject being perceptually related to concrete, mind-independent objects, property-instances, events, 
or a combination thereof.  
When I speak of perception as being representational without qualification, I mean no more than 
the idea that perception is a matter of a subject representing her environment such that her perceptual state 
is characterized by representational content. There are many different ways of understanding the nature of 
content given this constraint. For present purposes, it will suffice to say that the content can be conceived 
of as a Russellian proposition, a Fregean sense, an indexical content, a map of the environment, an image-
like representation, or in any number of other ways. Moreover, the content can be understood to be either 
conceptual or nonconceptual, propositional or nonpropositional, and as constituted by the particulars 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Brewer (2006) calls his the “object view.” I will refer to the view with the label “austere relationalism,” since the most distinctive 
features of the view are arguably the central role of relations between perceiving subjects and the world as well as its austerity.  
5 [Reference omitted for blind-refereeing.] 
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perceived or as independent of the particulars perceived. Finally, there are many different ways of 
understanding the relationship between phenomenal character and content. Indeed, accepting the thesis 
that perceptual experience is representational is compatible with thinking that the content and phenomenal 
character of mental states are entirely independent. So the thesis that perceptual experience is 
representational is agnostic on all possible ways of understanding the relationship between content and 
phenomenal character. I am using the term “representationalism” for any view that endorses the thesis 
that perceptual experience is constitutively a matter of representing. Representationalism, so understood, 
is neutral on the relationship between perceptual content and perceptual consciousness. 
It will be helpful to contrast the distinction between relationalism and representationalism with an 
orthogonal distinction between two ways of individuating experiential states. On a phenomenalist view, 
experiential states are individuated solely by their phenomenal character. Versions of this view have been 
defended by Price (1950), Moore (1953), Tye (1995), Lycan (1996), Byrne (2001), and Block (2003) 
among others. On an externalist view, experiential states are individuated not only by their phenomenal 
character but also by whatever external, mind-independent particulars (if any) to which the perceiver is 
perceptually related. Needless to say views differ wildly on just how perceived particulars make a 
difference to perceptual states. Versions of externalism have been defended by Searle (1983), McDowell 
(1984), Peacocke (1983, 2009), Campbell (2002), Martin (2002), Soteriou (2005), Brewer (2006), Byrne 
(2001, 2009), Johnston (2004), Hill (2009), Fish (2009), Burge (2010), Schellenberg (2010), Logue 
(2014), and Genone (2014) among others.  
The motivations for thinking that perception is constitutively representational typically go hand in 
hand with the motivations for embracing the phenomenalist view. Similarly, the motivations for thinking 
that perception is constitutively relational typically go hand in hand with the motivations for embracing 
the externalist view. However, the fault line between relationalism and representationalism does not 
coincide with the fault line between phenomenalist and externalist views. Sense-data theory, as defended 
by Price (1950) and Moore (1953), is a phenomenalist view that rejects representationalism. Moreover, 
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one can argue for an externalist view that endorses representationalism (Searle 1983, Peacocke 1983, 
McDowell 1984, Burge 2010, Byrne 2009, Hill 2009, and Schellenberg 2010). 
In what follows, I will consider the austere versions of both representationalism and relationalism 
in more detail and will assess how they fare in satisfying the particularity and phenomenal sameness 
desiderata. As I will argue, austere representationalists can easily satisfy the phenomenal sameness 
desideratum, but not the particularity desideratum. By contrast, austere relationalists can easily satisfy the 
particularity desideratum, but not the phenomenal sameness desideratum. I will offer a synthesis of these 
approaches that satisfies both desiderata. 
1.2. Austere Representationalism  
The key idea of austere representationalism is that to have a perception, illusion, or hallucination is to be 
in an experiential state with representational content that corresponds one-to-one with the phenomenal 
character of the experiencing subject: any changes in content go hand in hand with changes in 
phenomenal character and vice versa. Insofar as the representational content corresponds one-to-one with 
phenomenal character, it is phenomenal content.  
If representational content is phenomenal content, then two experiential states with the same 
phenomenal character cannot differ in content—irrespective of what particular, if any, the subject is 
related to. So a perceptual state can have the same phenomenal content as a mental state brought about by 
suffering a hallucination or illusion. According to austere representationalism, if I see Frederik on 
Monday and Ferdinand on Tuesday, my perceptual states will have the very same content. More 
generally, there can be an exact duplicate of an experiential state and its content, brought about by being 
perceptually related to particular α, in an environment in which the experiencing subject is perceptually 
related to the numerically distinct particular β. Furthermore, there can be an exact duplicate of an 
experiential state and its content in an environment in which the experiencing subject is not perceptually 
related to any relevant mind-independent particular. So if experiential content is phenomenal content, 
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then it is general content. There are many different ways of understanding general contents. They can be 
thought of as de dicto modes of presentation, Russellian propositions, or existentially quantified content 
to name just a few options.  
Stated more precisely, austere representationalism is committed to the following three theses: 
1. Experiential states have content.  
2. A perception, an illusion, and a hallucination can have the same phenomenal character. 
3. The content of an experiential state corresponds one-to-one with its phenomenal character in 
that any changes in content go hand in hand with changes in phenomenal character and vice 
versa.6 
It follows from these three theses that: 
4. Perceptual content is not constituted by the mind-independent particulars perceived.  
So austere representationalists are committed to denying that perceptual content is singular content, and 
thus cannot satisfy the particularity desideratum by appeal to the singular content of perception. I will 
embrace the first two theses of austere representationalism, but will reject the third. By rejecting the third 
thesis, the commitment to the fourth thesis can be avoided. 
First, however, let’s take a closer look at austere representationalism. One way of understanding 
experiential content under the constraint of the austere representationalist thesis is that it is existentially 
quantified content of the form that there is an object x that instantiates a property F: 
(ap,i,h)    (∃x)Fx 
Most objects instantiate a multitude of properties. For example, most visually perceivable objects 
instantiate spatial, color, and location properties. Most auditorily perceivable objects instantiate pitch, 
loudness, duration, and timbre properties. I will work with the simplifying assumption that there can be an 
experience (as) of an object that instantiates only one property. My argument, however, easily generalizes 
to the more realistic case in which one experiences an object instantiating a multitude of properties. 
                                                      
6 McGinn (1982), Davies (1992), Tye (1995), Lycan (1996), Byrne (2001), and Pautz (2009) among others have defended views 
that are committed to these three theses. 
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The thesis that experiential content is existentially quantified content posits that an experiential 
state represents only that there is an object that instantiates the relevant properties in the external world. 
No element of the content depends on whether such an object is in fact present. So it is possible to be in a 
mental state with the relevant content regardless of what object is present or even whether there is an 
object present. The perceived object does not fall out of the picture altogether: although no reference to 
the particular object perceived is necessary to specify the content, the austere representationalist can say 
that a subject perceives an object o at a particular location only if o satisfies the existential content of the 
subject’s experiential state. So the content is accurate only if there is an object at the relevant location that 
instantiates the properties specified by the content. The crucial point is that whether an object of the right 
kind is present bears only on the accuracy of the content. It has no repercussions for what is represented. 
The main advantage of austere representationalism is that it easily and elegantly explains how a 
perception, hallucination, and illusion could have the same phenomenal character. Indeed, accounting for 
this possibility is one of the main motivations for analyzing experiential content as phenomenal content. 
As Davies puts it: “the perceptual content of experience is a phenomenal notion: perceptual content is a 
matter of how the world seems to the experiencer ... If perceptual content is, in this sense, 
‘phenomenological content’ ... then, where there is no phenomenological difference for a subject, then 
there is no difference in content’’ (1992: 26). By equating experiential content with phenomenal content, 
austere representationalists can easily satisfy the phenomenal sameness desideratum.  
The main problem with austere representationalism is that it does not satisfy the particularity 
desideratum. The view cannot account for the difference between the perceptual content brought about by 
a subject perceiving cup1 at time t1 and her perceptual state brought about by being perceptually related to 
the qualitatively identical cup2 at time t2. Davies explicitly embraces this view: ‘‘if two objects are 
genuinely indistinguishable for a subject, then a perceptual experience of one has the same content as a 
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perceptual experience of the other’’ (1992: 26).7 According to austere representationalism, sameness of 
phenomenal character entails sameness of content. A view according to which two experiential states with 
the same phenomenal character cannot differ in content—irrespective of what particular, if any, the 
subject is related to—cannot satisfy the particularity desideratum in terms of perceptual content. 
Therefore, if perceptual content should reflect relational particularity, then perceptual content cannot be 
equated with phenomenal content. 
Now an austere representationalist could say that the perceptual relation between the perceiving 
subject and the perceived object does play a role. After all, the austere representationalist could argue that 
the form of a veridical perception is a conjunction of two elements, namely, the content and the relation to 
the perceived particular: 
(bp)   HS<(∃x)Fx> and RSα 
Subject S stands in a representation relation H to the existentially quantified content that there is an object 
x that instantiates the property F and S stands in a perceptual relation R to particular α. By contrast, the 
form of a hallucination is: 
(bh)   HS<(∃x)Fx> 
We can call this view conjunctivism. Conjunctivism has it that two elements are in place in a successful 
perceptual experience. In the case of a hallucination, the subject stands in relation only to the proposition 
that there is an object that has a certain property. Conjunctivism is a representational view that 
individuates perceptual experiences not just by the relevant mental states, but also by the perceptual 
relation between the experiencing subject and the environment. The problem with conjunctivism is that 
                                                      
7 McGinn (1982) and Millar (1991) argue for a similar thesis. This view is subject to well-known counterexamples, which I will 
not rehearse here. They have been discussed in detail by Soteriou (2000) and Tye (2007) by expanding on Grice’s (1961) 
discussion of so-called ‘‘veridical hallucinations.” Searle (1983) aims to account for particularity within the framework of 
existentially quantified contents by building causal conditions into the existential contents. In short, the idea is that a descriptive 
condition picks out an object as the cause of the experience. By doing so, Searle builds causal relations to particular objects into 
perceptual content. Given Searle’s view about the relationship between content and phenomenal character, this approach is at 
odds with the phenomenal character of experience. 
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the experiential state is in no way affected by the particular perceived (if any). Therefore, the particularity 
desideratum is not satisfied. Although conjunctivism builds perceptual relations between subjects and 
particulars into the form of perception, this relational element has no effect on any aspect of the 
perceptual state, for example, its content or phenomenal character. So conjunctivism is simply a version 
of austere representationalism that makes explicit that in the case of an accurate perception a perceptual 
relation holds between the subject and the perceived particulars.  
With austere representationalists, I will argue that phenomenal character does not track relational 
particularity. Yet against austere representationalists, I will argue that perceptual content is singular 
content. First, however, let’s assess how austere relationalism fares with regard to the particularity and 
phenomenal sameness desiderata. 
1.3. Austere Relationalism 
Austere relationalists argue that no appeal to representational content is necessary in a philosophical 
account of perception and that perception constitutively involves at least three components: a subject, her 
environment, and a perceptual relation between the subject and particulars in her environment. This 
perceptual relation is understood as, for example, an acquaintance or a sensory awareness relation. So 
austere relationalists have it that perception is constitutively a matter of a subject S standing in an 
acquaintance or an awareness relation R to a mind-independent particular α: 
(cp)  RSα 
In this way, austere relationalism conceives of the form of perception in a way that a hallucination could 
not possibly fit. As Brewer formulates the idea: 
The course of perceptual experience … provide[s] the subject with the grounds for her actual 
beliefs about the world, and also for the various other beliefs which she might equally have 
acquired had she noticed different things, or had her attention instead been guided by some 
other project or purpose. It does so, though, not by serving up any fully formed content, 
somehow, both in advance of, but also in light of, these attentional considerations, but, rather, 
by presenting her directly with the actual constituents of the physical world themselves. (2006: 
178) 
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Austere relationalism is a radical version of disjunctivism, that is, in short, the view according to which 
perceptions and hallucinations share no common element or do not belong to the same fundamental kind.8 
Traditionally disjunctivists argued that while hallucinations are not representational, perceptions do 
represent mind-independent particulars.9 Austere relationalism is a radical version of disjunctivism 
insofar as it denies not only that hallucinations are representational, but that perceptions are as well.  
Austere relationalism is structurally similar to sense-data theory and is motivated in part by its 
insights. So it will help to contrast the two views. Both views understand phenomenal character as 
constituted by the particulars perceived. However, while sense-data theorists argue that the particulars 
perceived are sense-data, austere relationalists argue that the particulars in question are material, mind-
independent objects, property-instances, or events. This difference has many repercussions. One 
repercussion is that sense-data theorists take the structure of a perception to be the very same as that of a 
hallucination. In both cases a subject’s experience consists in being acquainted with sense-data. Since 
hallucinations and perceptions have the very same structure, sense-data theorists can easily satisfy the 
phenomenal sameness desideratum. A second repercussion is that since sense-data theorists have it that a 
subject can be in the very same experiential state regardless of whether she is perceptually related to a 
mind-independent particular, the view is committed to denying that perceptual states are constituted by 
the particulars perceived. Therefore, sense-data theorists cannot satisfy the particularity desideratum. 
In contrast to sense-data theorists, austere relationalists conceive of the fundamental structure of a 
perception in a way that precludes hallucinations from having that structure. After all, since a 
hallucinating subject is not perceptually related to the material, mind-independent particular she seems to 
be seeing, a hallucination cannot be modeled on the RSα-form of perception. This way of thinking about 
perceptual experience has many virtues. The most salient for the present discussion is that austere 
                                                      
8 The metaphysical thesis that perception and hallucination share no common element was first articulated by McDowell (1982). 
Among others, Martin (2002) formulates the key idea of disjunctivism as being that perceptions and hallucinations do not belong 
to the same fundamental kind.  
9 See, for instance, Hinton 1973, Snowdon 1981, and McDowell 1982. 
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relationalists can easily satisfy the particularity desideratum. Insofar as the subject is perceptually related 
to particular α, her perceptual state is constituted by α.  
However, austere relationalism comes at a price. Austere relationalists account for relational 
particularity in terms of phenomenal character. As a consequence, the phenomenal character brought 
about by being perceptually related to α necessarily differs from the phenomenal character brought about 
by being perceptually related to β. This is the case even if α and β are qualitatively identical. Moreover, 
the phenomenal character of a perception will necessarily differ from the phenomenal character of a 
hallucination. So austere relationalists cannot satisfy the phenomenal sameness desideratum.  
The natural solution to the problem is to argue that it is not the phenomenal character of a 
perceptual state, but rather its content, that grounds relational particularity. Since the austere relationalist 
holds that perceptual states do not have representational content, this solution is not open to her. In the 
rest of this paper, I will present a way of satisfying the particularity desideratum while respecting the 
intuition that perceptions of numerically distinct, yet qualitatively identical particulars do not differ 
phenomenally. I will argue that although perceptions of numerically distinct particulars necessarily differ 
with regard to their content, this difference is not revealed in phenomenal character.  
2. Varieties of Singular Content 
If the content of perception is singular content, then what is the content of a hallucination? A hard-line 
response to this question is to argue that hallucinations have no representational content. Such a view is 
motivated by a particular understanding of what it means to represent an object: singular content is 
radically object-dependent, such that an experiential state has representational content only if the 
experiencing subject is perceptually related to a particular in her environment. So only if a subject is 
related to an object, can she represent the object. Drawing on this understanding of the conditions for 
representing an object, the conclusion is drawn that a hallucinating subject is not in a mental state with 
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content: it only seems to her that she is representing. So there is only the illusion of content.10  
A view on which perceptual content is radically object-dependent amounts to a disjunctivist view 
of experiential content. Content disjunctivists accept the austere relationalist thesis that perception and 
hallucination share no common element or do not belong to the same fundamental kind. In contrast to 
austere relationalists, however, they hold that a perceiving subject represents the particulars to which she 
is perceptually related.  
Content disjunctivists face the same problems as any other disjunctivists. One problem is that the 
cognitive significance and the action-guiding role of experiential content is downplayed. When a subject 
hallucinates, the way things seem to her plays a certain cognitive role. If it seems to her that she is 
perceptually related to a white cup, she may, for example, reach out and try to pick it up. If one denies 
that hallucinations have representational content, this cannot be explained. It is not clear how the mere 
illusion of content could motivate the subject to act. Consider Harman’s example of Ponce de Leon who 
was searching Florida for the fountain of youth (Harman 1990). The fountain of youth does not exist, yet 
Ponce de Leon was looking for something particular. As Harman argues convincingly, he was not looking 
for a mental object. He was looking for a mind-independent object that, as it so happened, unbeknownst 
to him, did not exist. A second problem—and the problem most salient for present purposes—is that, 
insofar as content disjunctivists hold that hallucinations do not represent, they leave unclear what explains 
the phenomenal character of hallucinations. So it is not clear how content disjunctivists satisfy the 
phenomenal sameness desideratum. While content disjunctivists acknowledge that a hallucination could 
seemingly have the same phenomenal character as a perception, they do little if anything to explain this 
phenomenon.  
The problems of disjunctivism are avoided if perceptual content is not understood as radically 
object-dependent. That would allow that hallucinations can have at least some kind of content. One way 
                                                      
10 Versions of this view have been defended by Hinton (1973), Snowdon (1981), Evans (1982), and McDowell (1982, 1984).  
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to develop such a view is to argue that the content of a hallucination involves a gap that in the case of a 
perception is filled by a particular. Traditionally, gappy contents are thought of in terms of Russellian 
propositions.11 On the gappy Russellian view, the content of hallucination expresses that the object that 
seems to be present seems to instantiate property F. The content of a hallucination will be an ordered pair 
of a gap and a property: 
(dh) <__, F> 
In the case of an accurate perception of an object o, the gap is filled by that object: 
(dp) <o, F> 
There are several problems with the Russellian gappy content view. One problem is that the content of 
hallucination has too little structure to account for hallucinations as of multiple objects. If I hallucinate a 
green dragon playing a red piano, the content of my experience will contain multiple gaps and nothing 
that marks their difference other than these gaps being bound with distinct properties. Putting aside the 
problem of how a gap could be bound by properties, it is unclear how such a view could account for the 
difference in phenomenal character between hallucinating a green dragon playing a red piano and 
hallucinating a green elephant riding a red bicycle.  
A second problem is that to account for a hallucination as of an object that seems to be 
instantiating a property that is in fact an uninstantiated property, such as supersaturated red or Hume’s 
missing shade of blue, the Russellian must conceive of the content of hallucination as potentially 
constituted by uninstantiated properties. By doing so, she commits herself not just to a controversial 
metaphysics of properties but also to a controversial view of phenomenal character. The view is 
metaphysically controversial since accepting the existence of uninstantiated properties requires some kind 
of Platonic ‘‘two realms’’-view on which there is more to reality than the concrete physical world. The 
                                                      
11 See Braun 1993. Such a Russellian way of thinking about gappy contents has been defended also by Bach (2007) and Tye 
(2007). [Reference omitted for blind-refereeing.]  
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view is phenomenologically controversial since it is not clear what it would be to be sensorily aware of a 
property.12 After all, properties are not spatio-temporally located and not causally efficacious. The 
Russellian could respond to the phenomenological problem by distinguishing between being sensorily and 
cognitively aware of something. This would allow her to accept that we cannot be sensorily aware of 
properties, but argue that hallucinating subjects are cognitively aware of properties. However, now the 
problem arises as to how a perception and a hallucination could have the same phenomenal character. 
After all, being cognitively aware of something is phenomenally distinct from being sensorily aware of 
something (see e.g. Kriegel 2011). If this is right, then it is unclear how the Russellian could satisfy the 
phenomenal sameness desideratum.13  
These problems are avoided, if perceptual content is understood as constituted by Fregean modes of 
presentation of mind-independent particulars rather than bare properties and objects. In the rest of this 
paper, I will develop and defend Fregean particularism, which will include a Fregean account of gappy 
contents. By doing so, I will present a way of satisfying both the particularity and the phenomenal 
sameness desiderata. 
3. Fregean Particularism 
The austere versions of relationalism and representationalism are not the only options. An alternative is to 
argue that perceptual experience is constitutively both relational and representational. On such a view, a 
perception, a hallucination, and an illusion with the same phenomenal character share a metaphysically 
substantial common element. However, there are also substantial differences with regard to their content: 
while the token content of perception is singular content, the form of illusion and hallucination is 
derivative of the form of perception. Perception plays multiple roles: it yields conscious mental states, it 
                                                      
12 For a classical elaboration of this worry, see Williams 1953. 
13 For a more detailed discussion of these two problems and for a discussion of alternative ways that the Russellian might respond 
to these two problems, see [reference omitted for blind-refereeing].  
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justifies beliefs, and it provides us with knowledge of our environment. To account for these multiple 
roles, perceptual content needs to serve multiple explanatory purposes. At the very least, perceptual 
content must have both a component that grounds perceptual consciousness and a component that, in the 
case of an accurate perception, grounds perceptual particularity. By grounding perceptual particularity the 
content can account for the epistemic role that perception plays in our lives.  
I will develop Fregean particularism by exploiting the idea that perceiving a particular is 
constitutively a matter of employing perceptual capacities by means of which that particular is 
discriminated and singled out. If one possesses a perceptual capacity, one can employ it even if no 
particular of the kind that the capacity functions to single out is present. Therefore, the very same 
perceptual capacities that are employed in perception (good case) can also be employed in illusion and 
hallucination (bad case).  
Now, the employment of such perceptual capacities generates a perceptual state that is 
characterized by representational content for the following two reasons: the employment of perceptual 
capacities generates a perceptual state that is repeatable and has accuracy conditions. Being repeatable 
and having accuracy conditions are jointly key signatures of representational content. I will give support 
to each claim in turn. The very same perceptual capacity Cα can be employed to single out particular α1 or 
to single out particular α2. Moreover, the same perceptual capacity can be employed to single out α1 at 
time t1 and at time t2 and thus yield the same perceptual state at t1 and t2.14 If this is right, then there is a 
repeatable element that is constitutive of perceptual states, namely, the perceptual capacities employed 
and, moreover, employing perceptual capacities generates a perceptual state that has a repeatable element. 
Now, when one discriminates and singles out a particular from its surround, one may do so more or less 
                                                      
14 One could argue that different time-slices bring about a difference in perceptual states. If one holds this, then the relevant 
perceptual state would be different, but it would be different only in this respect.  
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accurately, and the perceptual state generated thereby will be more or less accurate.15 After all, a perceiver 
can single out an object and correctly single out only very few of its properties; or she can single out the 
same object and correctly single out many of its properties. The first perceptual state will be less accurate 
with regard to the environment than the second.16 So employing perceptual capacities yields perceptual 
states that exhibit key signatures of representational content: it yields something that is at least in part 
repeatable and that can be accurate or inaccurate. With a few plausible further assumptions, these 
considerations establish that employing perceptual capacities yields perceptual states with content. The 
thesis that content is constituted by employing perceptual capacities that function to single out particulars 
implies that perceptual content is singular.17 After all, if the fact that perceptual capacities single out 
particulars in some situations but not others has any semantic significance, then the token content yielded 
by employing perceptual capacities in perception will be constituted by the particulars singled out.18  
By contrast, an austere representationalist view (or any other view on which perceptual content is 
general) holds that the content is the very same regardless of what particular (if any) the experiencing 
subject is related to. A general content lays down a condition that something must satisfy to be the object 
determined by the content. The condition to be satisfied does not depend on the mind-independent 
                                                      
15 One might object here that not all discriminatory capacities yield things that have accuracy conditions. For example, 
thermometers discriminate temperatures, but we do not say that the state thereby produced has accuracy conditions. In response, 
it is apt to say that the temperature indicated by the thermometer either matches the temperature in the environment or fails to 
match the temperature in the environment. In this sense, the state of the thermometer in which it indicates a particular 
temperature has accuracy conditions. 
16 For a discussion of the relationship between singling out objects and singling out the properties this object instantiates, see 
Pylyshyn and Storm 1988, Pylyshyn 2007, and Fodor 2008. 
17 [Reference omitted for blind-refereeing.] 
18 Here and throughout “A is constituted by B” is understood in the sense that A is at least partially constituted by B—leaving 
open that there may be other things that jointly with B constitute A. Moreover here and throughout “A is constituted by B” is 
understood such that it does not imply that A is materially constituted by B. So “A is constituted by B” does not imply that B is a 
component of A. There are a number of ways to understand constitution given these constraints. For the sake of specificity, I will 
work with the following notion of constitution: A is constituted by B, if and only if A is grounded in B, where grounding is 
understood as a relation that can hold between entities such as mental states and material, mind-independent particulars (and not 
just between propositions). So when I say that A is constituted by B, I mean that A is at least partially grounded in B without B 
being a component of A. “A grounds B” does not entail that A is a component of B”. For example, it is generally accepted that 
truthmakers ground the truth of the propositions they make true, and it is generally accepted that truth makers are not components 
of the propositions they make true.  
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particular that satisfies it. So the relation between content and object is simply the semantic relation of 
satisfaction.  
3.1. Perceptual Capacities and Modes of Presentation 
The idea that content is constituted by employing perceptual capacities by means of which we (purport to) 
single out particulars is analogous to the Fregean idea that modes of presentation are a way of grasping or 
referring to particulars. Indeed, it is analogous to the Fregean idea that modes of presentation both have a 
cognitive significance and are a means of referring to particulars. A mode of presentation is the specific 
way in which a subject refers to a particular. While Frege introduces the distinction between sense and 
reference with a perceptual case, he does not develop the notion for perceptual content. His focus was 
never on lowly mental faculties like perception. Nonetheless, we can apply his view of modes of 
presentation to the case of perception. Applied to that case, the idea is that a mode of presentation is the 
specific way in which a subject singles out a perceived particular. We can think of perceptual capacities 
as the mental counterpart of modes of presentation. While a mode of presentation is a component of a 
thought or a proposition, a perceptual capacity is a mental tool. According to Frege, concepts are 
mappings from objects onto truth-values (Frege 1879). Similarly, perceptual capacities are mappings from 
particulars onto accuracy conditions. 
One key motivation for introducing modes of presentation is to capture a fineness of grain in 
content that reference to mind-independent particulars alone could not achieve. On a Russellian 
understanding, alternative possible modes of presentation can be expressed only insofar as one may have 
different cognitive attitudes to the same content. The way in which one perceives or thinks of the object is 
not expressed in the content proper.  
Paralleling the distinction between singular and general content, there are two standard ways of 
thinking about Fregean modes of presentation. If one focuses on the role of modes of presentation as 
accounting for cognitive significance, then it is natural to think of them as de dicto. A de dicto mode of 
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presentation is general in that it can be the very same regardless of what (if anything) the experiencing 
subject is perceptually related to. If, by contrast, one focuses on the role of modes of presentation as a 
way of referring to a particular, then it is natural to think of them as de re. A de re mode of presentation is 
singular in that what particular (if any) the subject is perceptually related to has repercussions for the 
token content.  
A de dicto mode of presentation lays down a condition that something must satisfy to be the 
particular determined by the content. Chalmers, among others, understands Fregean senses in this way: 
‘‘Fregean content is supposed to be a sort of phenomenal content, such that, necessarily, an experience 
with the same phenomenal character has the same Fregean content’’ (2006a: 99, see also Thompson 
2009). A de dicto mode of presentation constitutes a way of representing mind-independent particulars 
irrespective of whether the relevant particulars are present. If the content of experiential states were 
constituted by de dicto modes of presentation, then the content of a perception, a hallucination, or an 
illusion with the same phenomenal character would be 
(ep,h, i) <MOPdo, MOPdF> 
where MOPdo is a de dicto mode of presentation of an object and MOPdF is a de dicto mode of 
presentation of a property. Such an account of perceptual content implies a two-stage view of determining 
reference: first, we represent a general content, and in a second step, we refer to mind-independent 
particulars based on this content.19 Representing a de dicto mode of presentation is, on this view, 
independent of the second step, in which a particular may be determined. Such a two-stage view faces the 
problem of how the content grounds the ability to refer to external particulars. Insofar as a de dicto mode 
of presentation can be the very same regardless of what (if anything) the experiencing subject is 
perceptually related to, this way of thinking about content amounts to a version of austere 
                                                      
19 For an argument against such a two-stage view of determining reference, see Johnston 2004: 150f. Johnston does not 
distinguish between de dicto and de re modes of presentation, and as a consequence sees the problem articulated in the main text 
as a problem for any Fregean view tout court. As I will show, it is only a problem for a view on which Fregean senses are de 
dicto rather than de re.  
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representationalism and faces all the difficulties of that view. Any view on which perceptual content is 
constituted by de dicto modes of presentation fails to satisfy the particularity desideratum for the same 
reasons that austere representationalism does. 
This problem is avoided if perceptual content is analyzed as constituted by de re rather than de 
dicto modes of presentation. Understanding modes of presentation as de re (rather than as de dicto) is 
motivated by recognizing that modes of presentation play a dual role: they have a cognitive significance, 
and they single out or refer to mind-independent particulars. Understanding perceptual content as 
constituted by de re modes of presentation recognizes that representing a particular is not independent of 
singling out the particular that is the referent of the sense. By contrast to de dicto modes of presentation, 
de re modes of presentation are singular in the good case.  
Now, on one way of understanding de re modes of presentation, a subject can have a contentful 
experience only if she is (perceptually) related to the very particular that she purports to single out. This 
view is a version of content disjunctivism, which we critically discussed in the previous section.20 What 
we need is an understanding of de re modes of presentation on which modes of presentation grounds the 
relational particularity of accurate perceptions and the phenomenological particularity of perceptions, 
hallucinations, and illusions.  
3.2. Content Types and Token Contents 
I argued that regardless of whether we are perceiving, hallucinating, or suffering an illusion, we employ 
perceptual capacities by means of which we purport to single out mind-independent particulars. Since in 
the bad case, we fail to single out the particulars that we purport to single out, our perceptual capacities 
are employed baselessly. They are employed baselessly insofar as they do not fulfill their function to 
operate on environmental particulars. This failure is not at the level of employing the relevant capacity, 
but rather at the level of singling out a particular. Employing perceptual capacities accounts for the fact 
                                                      
20 For a defense of such a view, see Evans 1982 and McDowell 1984.  
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that we are intentionally directed at a seeming particular, a process that invests the hallucinatory and 
illusory state with structure. Moreover, the argument that employing perceptual capacities yields a 
perceptual state with representational content in virtue of the capacities being repeatable and constituting 
a phenomenal state that is either accurate or inaccurate generalizes from perception to hallucination and 
illusion. So given that even in the bad case, the subject is employing perceptual capacities, there is good 
reason to think that her mental state has content.  
We have distinguished between employing perceptual capacities tout court (regardless of what if 
anything is singled out) and employing perceptual capacities while either successfully singling out a 
particular or failing to do so. We can apply this distinction to content and thereby distinguish between 
content types that are constituted by the perceptual capacities employed and token contents that are 
constituted both by the perceptual capacities employed and the particulars (if any) thereby singled out.  
A perception, a hallucination, and an illusion with the same phenomenal character will all be 
characterized by the same content type. After all, they all result from employing the same perceptual 
capacities. Thus, the phenomenal sameness desideratum is satisfied. However, their content token will 
differ at least in part. After all, in the case of perception, the perceiver successfully singles out the 
particulars she purports to single out, while, in the case of hallucination and illusion, the experiencing 
subject fails to single out at least one particular she purports to single out. Thus, the particularity 
desideratum is satisfied.  
3.3. Token Contents: Singular Modes of Presentation and Gappy Modes of Presentation 
How should we understand the token content of a perceptual state? According to Fregean particularism, 
the token content of an accurate perception e1 of a cup α1 and the property-instance π1 will be  
(contente1) <MOPrα(α1), MOPrπ(π1)> 
where MOPrrα(α1) is a singular mode of presentation of the cup α1 that is the product of employing a 
perceptual capacity that functions to single out the kind of object under which α1 falls. So “α1” is 
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functioning as the name of an object. “MOPrrα” is a functional expression that expresses a function from 
objects to singular modes of presentation. MOPrπ(π1) is a singular mode of presentation of the property-
instance π1 that is the product of employing a perceptual capacity that functions to single out instances of 
the property under which π1 falls. So while MOPrα(α1) is a de re mode of presentation of the object α1, 
MOPrπ(π1) is a de re mode of presentation of the property-instance π1. I am assuming that the res of a de 
re mode of presentation can be any mind-independent particular perceived, be it an object, a property-
instance, or an event. To avoid any confusion, I will speak of singular modes of presentation rather than 
de re modes of presentation. For any given particular there will be many possible modes of presentation. 
For the content specified by MOPrα(α1) to be determinate, it is important that it is conceived of as one 
particular mode of presentation of the relevant object. Similarly, for the content specified by MOPrπ(π1) to 
be determinate, it is important that it is conceived of as one particular mode of presentation of the relevant 
property-instance.  
A perception e2 that has the same phenomenal character as e1 and is of a qualitatively identical yet 
numerically distinct cup α2 and property-instance π2 will have the distinct content 
(contente2) <MOPrα(α2), MOPrπ(π2)> 
Given injectivity, MOPrα(α1) ≠ MOPrα(α2) and MOPrπ(π1) ≠ MOPrπ(π2). So token contents differ 
depending on the particular to which the subject is perceptually related. This is the case even if the 
particulars are qualitatively identical. 
In the case of a hallucination that has the same phenomenal character as e1, the same perceptual 
capacities are employed as in e1. But the environmental requirements for successfully singling out the 
particulars are not met. So no particulars are singled out. As a consequence, the capacities are employed 
baselessly and so the ensuing token content is defective.  
One way of understanding the idea that the content is defective is to say that it is gappy. There is 
nothing metaphysically spooky about gaps. The gap simply marks the failure to single out a particular. So 
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the content of a hallucination in which we purport to single out an object that instantiates a property is 
(contenth) <MOPrα(__), MOPrπ(__)> 
where MOPrα(__) specifies the kind of object that would have to be present for the experience to be 
accurate and MOPrπ(__) specifies the properties that this object would instantiate were the experience a 
perception rather than a hallucination. More specifically, MOPrα(__) is a gappy mode of presentation that 
is the product of employing a perceptual capacity that functions to single out objects of the kind that the 
hallucinating subject purports to single out while failing to single out any such object. It accounts for the 
intentional directedness of the experience at a (seeming) particular object. MOPrπ(__) is a gappy mode of 
presentation that is the product of employing a perceptual capacity that functions to single out property-
instances of the kind that the hallucinating subject purports to single out while failing to single out any 
such property-instance. It accounts for the intentional directedness of the experience at a property-
instance. In short, MOPrα(__) is a gappy, object-related mode of presentation and MOPrπ(__) is a gappy, 
property-related mode of presentation. So for a perceptual capacity to be employed baselessly amounts to 
the ensuing token content being gappy.21 
An example will help clarify the idea. Consider Hallie who suffers a hallucination as of a white 
coffee cup. The content of her hallucination specifies both the kind of object that would have to be 
present for her experience to be accurate and the properties that this object would have to instantiate. The 
content is indeterminate insofar as it does not specify any particulars. The content would be accurate if the 
subject were related to a particular white cup. It is important that the content would be accurate regardless 
                                                      
21 Burge has been read as defending a gappy content view. However, as Burge writes of his view, ‘‘I have heard interpretations ... 
according to which there is a ‘hole’ in the representational aspects of the proposition, where the hole corresponds to the object 
(which completes the proposition). I regard these interpretations as rather silly’’ (1977/2007: 75). Burge argues that there are 
demonstrative elements in the content of a mental state that are in place regardless of whether they refer to the object of 
experience. As he puts it, ‘‘I do not think that a physical re in the empirical world ... is itself ‘part of’ the belief. ... In my view, 
the Intentional side of a belief is its only side. In many cases, in my view, a belief that is in fact de re might not have been 
successfully referential (could have failed to be de re) and still would have remained the same belief. Moreover, the belief itself 
can always be individuated, or completely characterized, in terms of the Intentional content’’ (1991: 209). The way I am using 
the terms, what Burge refers to as de re would be more aptly labelled de dicto. More importantly, insofar as on Burge’s view the 
intentional content of two experiences can be the very same regardless of the environment, the content does not reflect relational 
particularity. 
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of whether the subject is perceptually related to this or that qualitatively identical white cup. This is just to 
say that the content of a hallucination does not reflect relational particularity.  
Depending on how one understands the nature of properties that subjects experience, one might 
argue that the content of hallucination is gappy only in the object-place, but not in the property-place. On 
such a view, the content of hallucination would be: (contenth)′ <MOPrα(__), MOPrπ(π1)>. By contrast, I 
am arguing that a hallucinating subject who seems to be perceiving a property instantiated by an object is 
not related to a property-instance. After all, she is not related to any relevant object that could be 
instantiating the property. Due to this, the content of a hallucination is not just gappy in the object-place, 
but also in the property-place. Of course, it is possible that while hallucinating, one accurately perceives 
many mind-independent particulars. In this case, only some of the modes of presentation constituting the 
content will be gappy. 
I will discuss the nature of gappy contents in more detail shortly, but for now let’s turn to illusions. 
In the case of an illusion that has the same phenomenal character as e1, the same perceptual capacities are 
employed as in e1, but, as in the case of hallucination, the environmental requirements for successfully 
singling out at least one of the particulars that the subject purports to single out are not met. Since the 
subject fails to single out a property-instance, the token content that ensues from employing the relevant 
perceptual capacity is gappy: 
(contenti) <MOPrα(α1), MOPrπ(__)> 
So the token content of an illusion is gappy only in the property-place.  
In sum, we can distinguish four different kinds of token contents of perceptual experience with 
same phenomenal character:  
(contente1) <MOPrα(α1), MOPrπ(π1)> 
(contente2) <MOPrα(α2), MOPrπ(π2)> 
(contenth) <MOPrα(__), MOPrπ(__)> 
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(contenti) <MOPrα(α1), MOPrπ(__)> 
Each of these four experiences instantiates the following content type: 
(contentType) <MOPrα[___], MOPrπ[___]> 
where MOPrα[___] can be tokened by MOPrα(α1), MOPrα(α2), MOPrα(α3), MOPrα(__), or any other 
singular mode of presentation of a particular.  
So Fregean particularism is characterized by the following three conditions:  
(1) The content of any two perceptions e1 and e1* that have the same phenomenal character and in 
which the subject is perceptually related to the same particular α1 in the same way will include 
the token singular mode of presentation MOPrα(α1), where MOPrα(α1) is constituted by 
employing the perceptual capacity Cα that functions to single out particulars of the type under 
which α1 falls. More specifically, MOPrα(α1) is the output of employing perceptual capacity Cα 
that takes particulars of the kind under which α1 falls as inputs. So MOPrα(α1) is constituted by 
the perceptual capacity employed and the particular α1 thereby singled out. 
(2) A perception e2 that has the same phenomenal character as e1, but in which the subject is 
perceptually related to the numerically distinct particular α2 will be constituted by employing 
the same perceptual capacity Cα. However, since the input in e2 is a different particular than in 
e1, the ensuing token content MOPrα(α2) is different. This is the case, even if α1 and α2 are 
qualitatively identical. So singular modes of presentation are injective: if α1≠α2, then 
MOPrα(α1) ≠ MOPrα(α2). 
(3) A hallucination or an illusion that has the same phenomenal character as e1 is constituted by 
employing the same perceptual capacity Cα but, since there is no relevant particular present, 
the perceptual capacity is employed baselessly. As a consequence, the token content 
MOPrα(__) is gappy.  
One objection waiting in the wings is that (contenth) is not an adequate way of characterizing the content 
of a hallucination since it cannot account for the fact that the content of a hallucination is inaccurate: 
given the presence of a gap, the content cannot determine an accuracy condition. In response, it is 
necessary to distinguish two ways in which a content can be inaccurate. One way is for the content to 
make a claim about the environment that is not accurate. A second way is for it to fail to make an accurate 
claim about the environment. To illustrate this second sense of inaccuracy, suppose that I claim that 
Pegasus lives in my apartment. This claim is inaccurate. Given that ‘‘Pegasus’’ does not refer, the 
inaccuracy in question is that I have failed to make an accurate claim about who lives in my apartment. If 
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inaccuracy is understood in this second way, then a hallucination can have a gappy content and 
nonetheless be inaccurate. On this understanding of gappy contents, the fact that a content is gappy 
implies that the content is necessarily inaccurate insofar as a gappy content could never make an accurate 
claim about the world.22 
On this view, there is nothing veridical about so-called ‘‘veridical hallucinations.’’ In such a case, a 
subject is hallucinating, say, an apple, and there happens to be an apple where she hallucinates one to be. 
But she is not perceptually related to the apple because there is a wall between her and the apple. As a 
consequence, the content of her experience is gappy. Indeed, the content of hallucinations with the same 
phenomenal character will have the same content—even if one hallucination is non-veridical and the 
other is a so-called ‘‘veridical hallucination.’’  
3.4. Content Types: Potentially Singular Modes of Presentation 
So far I have specified the token contents. How should we understand the content types? According to 
Fregean particularism, a perception, a hallucination, and an illusion with the same phenomenal character 
share a metaphysically substantial common element: the perceptual capacities employed. Employing 
perceptual capacities yields a content type that experiential states with the same phenomenal character 
have in common. So, Fregean particularism avoids any disjunctivist commitments. There is a stock of 
distinct content types MOPrα[___],MOPrβ[___], MOPrχ[___], MOPrδ[___], …. which combine with 
particulars to form singular modes of presentation of objects, property-instances, and events.  
Now, why are these content types not just general contents? In response, content types are 
potentially particularized contents. To motivate this, consider again Hallie who hallucinates a cup. On the 
basis of her hallucination, she thinks, “That is a white cup.” Since there is no white cup present, she fails 
to refer and the content of her thought is not singular. However, it is not general either. After all, she 
purports to refer to a mind-independent particular. Failing to be a singular content does not imply that the 
                                                      
22 For a dissenting view of the truth-value of gappy propositions, see Everett 2003.  
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content is general. There are other options. One alternative is to say that the content has the form of a 
singular content while failing to be a token singular content. It is a potentially singular content. As in the 
case of a failed singular thought, the content of hallucination is neither a general content nor a singular 
content. It is structured by two-levels: the content type and the token content; more specifically, a 
potentially particularized content type and a gappy token content. In virtue of its singular form, the 
experience manifests phenomenological particularity. The potentially particularized content type can be 
analyzed as a schema that gives the conditions of satisfaction of any perceptual state with that content.  
Although in the case of an accurate perception the token content is at least in part constituted by the 
particulars perceived, the very same content type can be tokened if no relevant particular is present. The 
token content of a hallucination is naturally not constituted by any mind-independent particulars 
perceived. While the content type is not dependent on particulars (if any) perceived it is nonetheless 
relational. It is relational since it is constituted by employing perceptual capacities that function to 
discriminate and single out particulars. As a consequence, relations to particulars are implicated in the 
very nature of content, even at the level of the content type.  
One might object that the content of a hallucination and the content of a perception could never be 
tokens of the same type. After all, the former is gappy and the latter is not. In response, particulars can be 
tokens of the same type even if the particulars differ significantly. For them to be tokens of the same type 
they need only to exhibit the feature relevant to classification under that type. There are many ways to 
type contents. One is with regard to whether or not they are gappy. On this way, gappy contents and non-
gappy contents would be tokens of different types. However, another way to type contents is with regard 
to the perceptual capacities employed that constitute the content. This is the kind of content types in play 
here.  
3.5. Advantages of Fregean Particularism 
The thesis that perceptual content is constituted by employing perceptual capacities allows for a 
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substantive way of analyzing perceptual content as nonconceptual. After all, perceptual capacities can be 
understood as nonconceptual analogs to concepts.  
A second advantage of Fregean particularism is that the thesis that perceptual content is constituted 
by employing perceptual capacities allows for a way to analyze the difference between perception and 
cognition as a difference in representational vehicle, where that difference in representational vehicle is 
explained in terms of a difference in the capacities employed. The representational vehicle of perceptual 
representation is the employment of perceptual capacities. The representational vehicle of cognition is the 
employment of cognitive capacities.  
A third advantage is that the view neither implies that the experiencing subject stands in a 
propositional attitude to the content of her experience nor does it rely on there being such a relation 
between the subject and the content of an experience. So there is no need to say that the experiencing 
subject ‘exes’ that p, —to use Byrne’s (2009) phrase. 
A fourth advantage is that Fregean particularism can easily account for hallucinations as of 
multiple objects. We rejected the Russellian gappy content view on grounds that it cannot account for 
hallucinations as of multiple objects. How can Fregean particularism account for such hallucinations? In 
response, hallucinations as of multiple objects are unproblematic for Fregean particularism, since it is the 
mode of presentation that is gappy and so the content of a hallucination is not altogether gappy in the 
object-place. As a consequence, there is sufficient structure to account for hallucinations as of multiple 
objects.  
3.6. Fregean Particularism, the Particularity Desideratum, and the Phenomenal Sameness 
Desideratum 
I have argued that the content of experiential states is constituted both by the perceptual capacities 
employed and the particulars (if any) thereby singled out. In this way, perceptual experience is 
constitutively both relational and representational. In this section, I will compare Fregean particularism to 
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austere relationalism and austere representationalism. In doing so, I will show how it satisfies both the 
particularity and the phenomenal sameness desiderata. 
Fregean particularism accepts the central relationalist insight that relations to particulars are 
constitutive of perceptual states. If perceptual content is constituted by perceptual capacities that function 
to discriminate and single out mind-independent particulars, then relations to particulars are implicated in 
the very nature of perceptual content. Moreover, if the fact that perceptual capacities single out mind-
independent particulars in some environments but not others has any semantic significance, then the 
content ensuing from employing perceptual capacities will be constituted at least in part by the perceived 
particulars.23  
Since perceptual content is constituted by the particulars perceived, Fregean particularism allows 
for a straightforward way of accounting for the particularity desideratum. The particular to which the 
subject is perceptually related secures the relational particularity of her perceptual state. There is a 
difference between the token contents of perceptions of numerically distinct but qualitatively identical 
objects. To explain this, consider Percy who sees a white cup at time t1. Without Percy noticing, the cup is 
replaced by a qualitatively identical cup, so that at time t2, Percy sees a cup that is numerically distinct 
from the one he saw at t1. The content of his perceptual state at t1 and at t2 is distinct despite the fact that 
the difference in content is not reflected in the phenomenal character of his perceptual states. The content 
of Percy’s perceptual states is distinct since it is constituted by a singular mode of presentation of a 
different object before and after the switch. So what Fregean particularism shares with relationalism (that 
austere representationalism lacks) is the ability to satisfy the particularity desideratum. 
However, in contrast to austere relationalism, Fregean particularism can easily account for the 
phenomenal sameness desideratum. Fregean particularism accepts the minimal representationalist 
commitment that perception is constitutively a matter of representing one’s environment such that one’s 
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perceptual state is characterized by representational content. Employing perceptual capacities in a sensory 
mode constitutes both the representational content and the phenomenal character of experiential states. In 
experiential states with the same phenomenal character, the same perceptual capacities are employed in 
the same sensory mode. So in contrast to disjunctivists and austere relationalists, I am arguing that a 
hallucination, an illusion, and a perception with the same phenomenal character share a common element 
that explains their sameness in phenomenal character. 
How does Fregean particularism make room for content that manifests phenomenological 
particularity while lacking relational particularity? In response, even if one happens to be hallucinating or 
suffering an illusion, the capacities employed do not cease to function to do what they do in the case of 
perception, namely, discriminate and single out particulars in the environment. Employing them is the 
basis for the intentional directedness at particulars in perception and accounts for the intentional 
directedness at a seeming particular in illusion and hallucination. Thus, employing perceptual capacities 
accounts for the fact that when we suffer an illusion or a hallucination, it seems to us as if a particular is 
present. In this way, employing perceptual capacities grounds phenomenological particularity. So while 
the gap in the token content of a hallucination marks the lack of relational particularity, the intentional 
directedness at an object is accounted for by the (gappy) mode of presentation. Even though in the case of 
illusion or hallucination, the experiencing subject fails to single out at least one of the particulars that she 
purports to single out, the gappy token content is inherently related to external and mind-independent 
particulars of the type that the subject’s perceptual capacities function to single out in the good case. 
Whether a perceptual capacity is employed baselessly will not affect the phenomenal character of the 
experience. Only if this is the case can the view satisfy the phenomenal sameness desideratum. For only if 
it is not revealed in phenomenal character whether a perceptual capacity is employed baselessly could a 
perception, an illusion, and a hallucination have the same phenomenal character.  
So, with representationalists but against austere relationalists, I am arguing that the phenomenal 
character of a hallucination manifests phenomenological particularity without being characterized by 
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relational particularity. However, with relationalists and against austere representationalists, I am arguing 
that the content of perception grounds relational particularity. Fregean particularism satisfies the 
particularity desideratum since it does not equate perceptual content with phenomenal content. Although 
content types remain the same across experiential states with the same phenomenal character, token 
contents are constituted by the particulars (if any) perceived. As a consequence, there can be differences 
in content that are not reflected in phenomenal character. While Fregean particularism rejects the austere 
representationalist thesis that perceptual content is phenomenal content, and consequently is not 
compatible with so-called strong representationalism, it is compatible with weak representationalism. 
That said, if the content type is the same between two experiences, the phenomenal character will be the 
same. So Fregean particularism holds that there is a kind of content that covaries with phenomenal 
character. 
4. Fregean Particularism and Alternative Views 
It has been argued that a content that purports to be of a particular object but fails to refer is best thought 
of as a general content (Burge 2010). It has, moreover, been argued that a singular content is object-
dependent such that we cannot be in a mental state with a token content that purports to be of a particular, 
but fails to refer (Evans 1982, McDowell 1984).  
Fregean particularism avoids the pitfalls of both approaches in that it makes room for a notion 
content that manifests phenomenological particularity but lacks relational particularity. According to 
Fregean particularism, the content of hallucination is structured by a content type and a token content, 
neither of which is a general content. The content type is a potentially particularized content schema. The 
token content is gappy. In contrast to a view on which de re modes of presentation are radically object-
dependent such that there cannot be a token content if there is no object to be represented, Fregean 
particularism shows that de re modes of presentation are only partly constituted by the particulars 
perceived. Singular modes of presentation are constituted by the perceptual capacities employed and the 
  35 
particulars perceived. While the perceptual capacities employed provide the general element of perceptual 
content, the objects, events, and property-instances singled out provide the particular element. If no 
particulars are perceived, as in the case of a total hallucination, the token content is constituted only by 
the perceptual capacities employed. While the token content of hallucination is defective in virtue of the 
perceptual capacities being employed baselessly, the mere fact that perceptual capacities are employed 
gives the token content enough structure to ground the phenomenal character and thus the 
phenomenological particularity of hallucinatory states. So Fregean particularism makes room for 
hallucinations to have a token content, even though no mind-independent particular is perceived. 
In contrast to the gappy Russellian view discussed earlier, Fregean particularism does not posit that 
the object-place is gappy in the case of a hallucination. It is rather the mode of presentation in the object-
place that is gappy. So even if one hallucinates multiple objects, there is enough structure in the content to 
distinguish the various objects that one seems to be perceiving. The structure is provided by the gappy 
modes of presentation.  
Now, one might argue that there is no reason to appeal to gaps to account for the content of 
hallucinations. An alternative solution is to say that the gaps are filled by intentional objects. On such a 
view, experience is a matter of representing properties that are attributed to intentional objects (see Lycan 
1996 and Crane 1998). These intentional objects can be thought of as existing abstracta or as non-existing 
concreta. Such a view is less attractive than Fregean particularism for at least two reasons. One reason is 
that if hallucinations are construed as relations between subjects and intentional objects, then one is 
pressed to construe perceptions as relations between subjects and intentional objects as well. However, 
doing so leads to well-known problems.24 A second reason is that positing intentional objects does not 
secure any explanatory advantage over Fregean particularism with regard to the phenomenal character of 
                                                      
24 For a discussion of the skeptical problems that ensue if the content of mental states is understood as constituted by intentional 
objects or relations to intentional objects, see Brewer 1999. Loar (2003) argues that a view on which perception is construed as a 
relation to an intentional object is phenomenally implausible.  
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experience, and is furthermore less powerful in explaining both the relational particularity of perceptions 
and the absence of relational particularity in hallucinations. Finally, a difference in token contents 
between perceptions and hallucinations with the same phenomenal character can explain the epistemic 
difference between them.25 An intentional object view does not have this benefit.  
I have argued that perceptual content should be understood as serving multiple explanatory roles 
insofar as it grounds both phenomenal character and perceptual particularity. An alternative way of 
satisfying these two explanatory roles is to argue that experience has multiple layers of content. On such a 
multiple contents view, different layers of content satisfy the two explanatory roles. There are many 
reasons to introduce multiple layers of content. My argument, if right, undermines at least one motivation 
for the multiple contents view, namely, the motivation that one layer grounds phenomenal character while 
another layer accounts for the reference-fixing role of perception. Chalmers (2006b) argues, for example, 
that one layer is a Fregean content that is associated with a primary intension that is a function from 
centered worlds to extensions (where the Fregean content is understood as de dicto), while the other layer 
is a Russellian content that is associated with a secondary intension, which is a function from uncentered 
worlds to extensions. What these views have in common is that one layer of content grounds phenomenal 
character, while the other determines the reference of the mental state. 
Fregean particularism is motivated by many of the same concerns as the multiple contents view, 
but it does not entail the multiple contents view, and it is not a particular version of that view. The 
multiple contents view entails that experience has different sets of accuracy conditions associated with the 
different layers of content. The thesis that experience has multiple explanatory purposes involves no such 
entailment. While on Fregean particularism, any perception, hallucination, and illusion is characterized by 
a content type and a token content, the content type and token content do not constitute two distinct layers 
of content. After all, they do not determine two different sets of accuracy conditions. Only the token 
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content determines accuracy conditions. The content type is no more than a content schema. So according 
to Fregean particularism, the content of a perceptual experience has only one set of accuracy conditions. 
Thus the view provides a way of satisfying the different explanatory roles of perceptual content without 
introducing a second layer of content. As the second difference between the two views will show, there 
are powerful reasons to resist introducing multiple layers of content to account for the different 
explanatory roles of perceptual content. 
In contrast to the multiple contents view, Fregean particularism is a view of both the constituents of 
perceptual content and of what holds these constituents together. It takes seriously Frege’s insight that 
modes of presentation play a dual role: they have a cognitive significance and they determine a 
reference—at least in the successful case. On the multiple contents view, the cognitive significance and 
the reference-determining roles of content are accounted for on different levels of content. Experiences 
with the same phenomenal character will have the same content on one level, but, depending on their 
environment, they may have a different content on the other level. The relation between the phenomenal 
content and the perceived object is simply the semantic relation of satisfaction. 
Insofar as the multiple contents view analyzes perception as the co-instantiation of two independent 
elements it is a version of what I called conjunctivism. It is a version of conjunctivism on which the 
relational element is not simply a perceptual relation between a subject and an object, but rather 
constitutes an object-dependent layer of content. In contrast to the simple version of conjunctivism that I 
considered in Section 1, the multiple contents view can satisfy the particularity desideratum, since one 
level of content is constituted by the particulars perceived. However, since the layer of content that 
accounts for relational particularity is independent of the layer of content that grounds phenomenal 
character, the question arises as to how phenomenal contents are connected to what they are about. 
Consider Chalmers’s epistemic two-dimensional semantics. As Chalmers notes, ‘‘primary intensions do 
not determine extensions in a strong sense (although they may still determine extension relative to 
context)’’ (2006b: 596). The layer of content that grounds the phenomenal character of the experience 
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does not itself determine an extension. Chalmers considers the possibility of accounting for the reference-
determining role of modes of presentation by stipulating that the content of an expression-token is an 
ordered pair of its primary intension and its extension (2006b: 596). Although such an ordered pair plays 
the role of determining reference, it does so trivially, given that the extension is part of the ordered pair. 
The question remains as to how the primary intensions, that is, the phenomenal contents, are connected to 
what they are about. 
The notion of a singular mode of presentation that I have developed cannot be identified with an 
ordered pair of a de dicto mode of presentation and a referent. To deny that the content can be identified 
with such an ordered pair is not to deny that the content can be analyzed into two layers, one of which is 
constituted by the perceived particular (if any), the other of which is independent of the perceived 
particular (if any). However, the ability to analyze A in terms of B does not imply that A is identified with 
B.26 Being in a perceptual state is not just a matter of being intentionally directed at a (seeming) mind-
independent particular and, in the successful case, being causally related to that mind-independent 
particular. Content needs to be connected to its referent by some non-attributional means. On Fregean 
particularism, perceptual capacities fulfill the role of connecting mental states with the particulars 
perceived. Perceptual capacities play both a reference-fixing role and constitute content that grounds 
phenomenal character. Thus, employing perceptual capacities constitutes singular modes of presentations, 
namely modes of presentation that are constituted by the perceptual capacities employed and the 
particulars thereby singled out. In this way, employing perceptual capacities constitute representational 
content that account for the Fregean idea that modes of presentation both have a cognitive significance 
and are a means of referring to particulars. 
                                                      
26 For a critical discussion of two-dimensional semantics, see also Speaks 2009. 
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5. Coda 
If a distinction is drawn between what an experience is of and what one takes one’s experience to be of, 
then we can drive a wedge between the content and the phenomenal character of an experience, without 
thinking of them as entirely independent. By driving a wedge between phenomenal character and content, 
one can account for the possibility that a perception, a hallucination, and an illusion can have the same 
phenomenal character while accounting for differences that are due to the experiencing subject being 
perceptually related to different particulars (or not being perceptually related to any particulars). Content 
plays the dual role of grounding relational particularity in the case of an accurate perception and 
grounding phenomenological particularity regardless of whether the subject is perceiving, hallucinating, 
or suffering an illusion. Moreover, insofar as employing perceptual capacities constitutes phenomenal 
character and secures the reference of the perceptual state, Fregean particularism rejects all ways of 
factorizing perceptual content into internal and external components. In this way, the suggested view 
combines the virtues of relationalism and representationalism, while avoiding the difficulties of the 
austere versions of these views. According to Fregean Particularism, perceptual content is constituted by 
general elements, namely the perceptual capacities employed, and particular elements, namely the 
external, mind-independent particulars perceived.  
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